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North Korea’s Human Rights Insecurity: State Image
Management in the Post-UN COI Era
Sarah A. Son *
Abstract
The 2014 report of the United Nations
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in
North Korea marked a watershed moment in
international awareness and action on North
Korea’s human rights problem. It sparked
widespread international condemnation, and
prompted anxiety and insecurity on the part
of North Korea, evident in the North’s immedi-
ate response. This included a verbal counter-
offensive, some surprising willingness to
engage with UN mechanisms, and a range of
diplomatic engagement. I argue that contrary
to the popular perception of North Korea as
impervious to external criticism, when viewed
through the conceptual lens of ontological
security, the North’s response to the UN COI
revealed a desire to defend and secure its im-
age in the eyes of the international community.
While acknowledging continuing obstacles to
a genuine normative transition in its approach
to human rights, the article supports a deeper
understanding of North Korea’s self-identity
to guide measures to bring about change.
Key words: North Korea, human rights,
United Nations, ontological security, identity
1. Introduction
In February 2014, the Chairman of the United
Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (UN COI, North Korea) described
North Korea’s human rights record as being
‘without parallel in the contemporary world’
(Kirby 2014). The COI report’s detailed pre-
sentation of the scale, duration and gravity of
abuses attracted significant international atten-
tion, including disapproval from states that
had formerly been less critical of North Korea
(Cohen 2014). A key aspect of the report that
appeared to generate particular concern within
the regime was the recommendation (later in-
corporated in General Assembly (GA) resolu-
tions), that the UN Security Council refer the
situation to the appropriate international crimi-
nal justice mechanism, to ensure that ‘those
most responsible for the crimes against
humanity… are held accountable’ (Report of
the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
2014, para. 87). In October 2016, a UN group
of experts was formed alongside the appoint-
ment of a new UN Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in North Korea to
work specifically on the question of account-
ability for alleged crimes against humanity.
Their combined recommendations, released in
early 2017, continued the call for referral to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Report
of the Group of Independent Experts 2017).
Consequently, after years of largely denying
the existence of a human rights problem,
North Korean officials embarked on a range
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of initiatives to try to counter the COI’s impact.
These moves included North Korea’s foreign
minister visiting the UN GA for the first time
in 15 years, the submission of an alternative hu-
man rights report and the sudden, belated accep-
tance of nearly half the recommendations from
the 2009 Universal Periodic Review (UPR)—a
UN process where states review one another’s
human rights records and make recommenda-
tions—in May 2014 (Chow 2017, p. 146).
The continuing, and much remarked upon
diplomatic and discursive response from North
Korea since the UN COI warrants investigation
into how and why such concern was felt.
The material consequences of increased
sanctions—routinely blamed for preventing
‘human rights enjoyment’ (Council for Foreign
Relations 2014) by the North Korean state—
are an obvious motivation to defend its record
and campaign for ‘no’ votes to resolutions at
the UN. However, studies on human rights
and norm adoption provide a powerful argu-
ment for considering the way identities, inter-
ests and moral values guide state interactions,
and work in a ‘causal relationship’ with mate-
rial factors (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 6; see
alsoKatzenstein 1996). As Risse and Sikkink’s
comprehensive review of human rights norm
adoption globally finds, there are ‘many exam-
ples of some human rights changes occurring
apparently because leaders of countries care
about what leaders of other countries think
about them’ (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 8). To
address the role that ideational factors such as
identity and a state’s international image may
play in the North Korean response to criticism
over its human rights record, I engage with
theory at the intersection of human rights norm
‘socialisation’ (Ballbach 2015; Risse &
Sikkink 1999) and the politics of state image-
making (Browning 2015; Steele 2008).
This article comes alongside several key
studies undertaken both pre- and post-COI,
which analyse the North Korean response to in-
ternational pressure over human rights (Chow
2017; Fahy 2018; Goedde 2010; Song 2011;
Weatherley& Song 2008). Referencingmodels
of human rights norm adoption, these studies
concur that North Korea has made changes as
a result of criticism (Fahy 2018) as part of
efforts to ‘boost its international image’ (Chow
2017, p. 147) and argue that this positions
North Korea somewhere along a trajectory
towards normative improvement. Yet there re-
mains space for alternative analysis of North
Korea’s approach to human rights from an in-
ternational relations perspective, exploring the
role of state identity and the mechanisms that
drive the imperative to control the security of
that identity narrative. I also consider how iden-
tity management on human rights intersects
with the North’s overall state image, within
which nuclear weapons and missile develop-
ment also play a significant part. Drawing on
a constructivist reading of international
relations, it will be shown that certain gestures
towards improvement in its human rights re-
cord are being made as a result of international
attention, as part of its broader identity strategy.
I argue that the need to maintain control over its
identity narrative and assert its legitimacy inter-
nationally have made human rights more
relevant. Thus, the areas where North Korea is
willing to make concessions on human rights
should be known in order to identify which
areas may be more open to discussion in
future human rights dialogue (Hawk 2014,
p. 237).
2. Identity, Security and Image
Management
As Ballbach rightly notes, scholarship on
North Korea’s foreign policy was long
characterised by ‘a dominance of description’
(Ballbach 2015, p. 140). The dearth of theoret-
ical works providing generalised insights into
North Korea’s behaviour has more recently
been remedied by research that broadens inter-
pretation beyond conventional materialist ap-
proaches (Ballbach 2015, p. 140; see for
example Bleiker 2005; Kim 2016). The con-
structivist approach sees the state as a project
in the making, which does not emerge with a
predefined identity, but rather as a social actor,
whose sense of ‘Self’ is constantly evolving,
usually in relation to significant Others
(Campbell 1998). It is argued that the state
seeks self-determination and confirmation
fromOthers rather than autonomy, and is liable
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to experience anxiety because of its need to
maintain a sense of ‘ontological security’, or
a stable sense of self-identity (Giddens 1984,
p. 50; Steele 2008, p. 72; see also Mitzen
2006). On this basis, if the state Self is a project
in the making, which is never complete, ‘for-
eign policy is not simply the response of a
pre-given subject to its environment’ (Ballbach
2015, p. 142; drawing on Campbell 1998).
Rather, it is part of a ‘political performance’,
delineating the characteristics of the state Self
and is designed to produce a specific mode of
subjectivity (Ballbach 2015, p. 142).
Literature on the image management prac-
tices of states contributes to understanding the
significance of non-material factors such as
anxiety in how a state perceives its security,
particularly the ‘ontological importance of nar-
rative’ (Steele 2008, p. 72). Here, it is argued
that overcoming anxiety is connected with en-
suring a stable and coherent identity narrative
to project to the world (Steele 2008, p. 72).
Browning states that in today’s world ‘our ex-
perience of social reality is increasingly medi-
ated globally’ with trust in social relations
becoming more reliant on reputation and
claims to expertise (Browning 2015, p. 197;
see also Giddens 1990, p. 18). The particular
type of stories states seek to tell about them-
selves is therefore evolving: enhancing a
state’s dignity is to secure international recog-
nition for the state as an actor that is morally
sound and worthy of positive recognition
(Browning 2015, p. 196). Risse and Sikkink
apply ‘community of liberal states’ to describe
the sphere where ‘peace, democracy and hu-
man rights’ are upheld, and where ‘good’ states
can claim membership (Risse & Sikkink 1999,
p. 8). Writing on the practice of ‘doing good’
as a policy objective of states, Browning notes
that internationalist policies serve as a ‘perfor-
mative platform’ for states to elicit esteem
and prestige (Browning 2011, 11). It must be
noted that such efforts often also have an im-
portant internal component, because ‘foreign
policy is not simply about interacting with
others but also entails communicating values
and identity narratives to citizens’, as part of
transmitting a sense of national mission and
purpose (Browning 2015, 196–198).
It is this interpretation of state behaviour that
lends weight to the argument made by theorists
of human rights norm adoption that reputations
are a pivotal part of ‘socialising’ noncompliant
states into ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ (Risse
& Sikkink 1999, p. 20; see also Hafner-Burton
2008). This is not to deny that national
governments may respond to, and ultimately
cooperate with international pressure only to
gain access to foreign aid, or to be able to stay
in power (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 10). How-
ever, as Risse and Sikkink note, ‘this is rarely
the end of the story’, and empirical research
suggests that reasons associated with beliefs
and identities work alongside instrumental
interests to influence state behaviour (Risse &
Sikkink 1999, p. 20). Risse and Sikkink’s
Spiral Model of human rights change is a useful
model to interpret the remarkable measures
North Korea has employed to address the
COI’s claims and recommendations. It provides
a framework to explore the salience of identity
and state image in the preliminary stages of hu-
man rights norm socialisation (Risse & Sikkink
1999, p. 20; Risse & Ropp 2013, p. 8). Doing
so helps move beyond descriptive accounts of
these events to shed light on whether North
Korea’s behaviour is less exceptional than is of-
ten believed. It also helps illuminate the extent
to which concerns about its overall ontological
security may continue to be used as leverage
to affect deeper change in its approach to hu-
man rights.
3. The United Nations Commission of
Inquiry Report
The findings of the UN COI were not the first
time the scale and seriousness of human rights
abuses taking place in North Korea had been re-
ported. The 327-page document, which drew on
testimonies from hundreds of witnesses who had
defected from North Korea, corroborated infor-
mation presented for over a decade. Yet these
prior efforts, which led to resolutions at the UN
GA and the Human Rights Council, yielded only
rejection from North Korea on the basis that its
‘people-centered socialist system’ simply could
not have a human rights problem (Hawk 2014,
p. 213). However, there were two key elements
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of the COI report that appeared to spark particu-
lar concern within the regime. The first was the
finding that the scale of North Korea’s human
rights violations exceeded the high threshold for
crimes against humanity. The second was the
recommendation to refer North Korea’s leaders
—including Kim Jong Un—to the ICC (Report
of the commission of inquiry on human rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
2014). For a country where the leader is revered
as a deity, this was the gravest of affronts. Since
that time, further resolutions have been passed,
while the USA introduced sanctions linked to
specific individuals within the regime. A UN Se-
curity Council referral to the ICC has yet to come
to fruition and it is likely that Russia and China
would exercise their veto on this point.
However, in December 2015, the USA added
‘human rights abuses in North Korea’ to the per-
manent Security Council agenda, making the
subject a recurring item of discussion
(Institutional Human Rights Violations 2015).
These developments follow the conventions
of typical, first-stage processes outlined by
Risse and Sikkink in the Spiral Model. In situ-
ations where there is weak (or in North Korea’s
case, non-existent) organised opposition inside
the country, key first steps to advancing change
include the work of international/transnational
advocacy networks to mobilise international
organisations and liberal states to take action
(Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 20). The COI and
the subsequent UN resolutions that were
passed also drew clear lines around what
constitutes morally sound behaviour. The COI
report, UN resolutions and Special Rapporteur
reports drew heavily on the language of
‘fundamental’ and ‘universal’ norms that are
implicitly connected with ‘responsible’ state
behaviour. Furthermore, the votes on the post-
COI resolutions made clear that it was not just
the ‘liberal state community’ that disapproved
of North Korea’s behaviour: even states that
had formerly abstained from votes on North
Korean human rights felt obliged to support
the new resolutions.1 The responsibility of the
international community to protect the North
Korean population from ‘the most serious
violation of international humanitarian law
and international human rights’ had been made
clear and its effects were being felt (Security
Council Adopts Procedural Vote 2016). At this
point, it is necessary to turn to the North
Korean response to these events and to examine
how it sought to practice damage control.
4. The North Korean Counter Offensive
The North Korean response to the UN COI,
and later to the resolutions it prompted, took
various forms. Each of these areas of response
deserves attention in relation to the connection
between the state’s reputation and the actions it
deems significant to asserting an image that is
viewed as legitimate by other states and inter-
national actors.
4.1. Words of Denial
The Spiral Model cites denial as the typical
second stage of human rights norm
socialisation, because offending governments
‘are at least implicitly aware that they face a
problem in terms of their international reputa-
tion’ (Risse & Sikkink 1999, pp. 23–24). The
opinion of the North Korean state on the COI
report and its alleged intentions is summed up
in the following statement, from an official
government report submitted to the UN in
September 2014:
The US and its followers conduct the smear
campaign against the DPRK over the human
rights issues with its intention to mislead the
public opinion and raise the non-existent ‘human
rights issues’ in the DPRK as the international
issue. They also intend to defame the image of the
DPRK in the international arena and dismantle
the socialist system under the pretext of
‘promotion of human rights’. (DPRK HR Report
2014, p. 108, emphasis added).
Here, North Korea seeks to link the human
rights issue to national security, in both its
physical and social dimensions. As Fahy’s
1. Non-Aligned Movement member states share a com-
mitment to non-interference in domestic affairs, which in-
cludes opposition to all country-specific resolutions at the
UN. This accounts for the high number of abstentions that
usually occur (Hawk 2014, p. 218).
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comprehensive analysis of North Korea’s post-
COI discourse has shown, the motive for the
COI is defined as US-inspired and as a plot to
overthrow the North Korean regime via defa-
mation in the eyes of the international commu-
nity, while human rights issues are situated as a
channel to achieve the larger goal of ‘disman-
tling’ the socialist system (Fahy 2018).
It quickly became clear that the ICC referral
recommendation was pivotal to the North’s
amplified response. A document titled the
Detailed Report on Secret behind Anti-DPRK
‘Human Rights Resolution’ issued by the North
Korean government in November 2014
restated the severity of the offence caused by
mention of criminal accountability for the lead-
ership by concluding, “Growing stronger are
the voices calling for dealing merciless
sledge-hammer blows at those who hurt even
the dignity of the supreme leadership of the
DPRK fully representing the people, which
cannot be bartered for anything” (quoted in
Hawk 2014, p. 227). In an unprecedented
public discussion at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York in October 2014, am-
bassador of the permanent mission of North
Korea to the UN, Jang Il Hyun, described the
proposed ICC referral as something ‘we can
no longer stand,’ saying ‘we have to take ac-
tion on our own in response to such a political
plot’ (Council for Foreign Relations 2014).
However, while the Spiral Model casts denial
as concurrent with a ‘continuing refusal to rec-
ognise the validity of international human
rights norms’ (Risse & Ropp 2013, p. 6), a
distinction in the North Korean response was
a tendency not to discredit the validity of all
international human rights norms or the
international instruments designed to define
and support them per se, but rather to deny that
North Korea was in violation of them, to argue
for defining rights according to national
conditions, or blame the ‘US-led’ hostility
and international sanctions plot for making it
impossible for the North to fully uphold its
people’s rights, even though it claims a desire
to do so (DPRK HR Report, pp. 97–104, see
also Fahy 2018). A fundamental tension thus
emerges, between recognising the sovereignty
of all countries and their right to pursue their
own path, while also arguing that human rights
is a legitimate area of international concern
(Haggard 2014). Several key statements in
the period following the COI highlight this ten-
sion between the state’s sovereign rights and
international cooperation on human rights.
In mid-September 2014, North Korea’s
DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies
(most likely under the control of the Korean
Workers Party) published a lengthy report
(DPRK HR Report) that Hawk describes as re-
vealing ‘a great deal about how a powerful
governing organ of the North Korean state sees
itself and the world’ (Hawk 2014, p. 221). In
line with Song and Weatherly’s analysis of
North Korean human rights discourse pre-
COI, the report defines three key features of
the North Korean interpretation of human
rights: (i) human rights are conditional and
shaped by ‘the demand and reality of the na-
tion-state’, (ii) collective rights are above indi-
vidual rights—‘the right of the individual apart
from the social collective is unthinkable’, and
(iii) welfare and subsistence rights have special
importance (Weatherley & Song 2008, p. 273;
see also Fahy 2018). The argument is then bol-
stered by a thorough, but somewhat contradic-
tory, accounting of North Korea’s participation
in the international instruments and mecha-
nisms to which it has made commitments,
and its efforts to adopt or amend local laws in
accordance with these commitments (DPRK
HR Report, pp. 93–96).
Computational analysis by Fahy shows that
an additional means of countering the COI’s
claims was evident in attempts to re-dress
North Korea’s image relative to those states it
positions as the masterminds behind the COI
report (2018). The post-COI state discourse
contained frequent instances of what Fahy
terms tu quoque, or ‘turning accusations back
on the accuser’ (2018). The accusers were de-
fined as the ‘US and Western countries’, with
special attention given to South Korea, and to
the EU and Japan as co-sponsors of the No-
vember 2014 GA resolution (Fahy 2018;
DPRK HR Report). The accusations levelled
at these hostile parties included claims about
US-led human rights crimes abroad and the
suffering of the people of the USA, Japan and
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EU-member nations at the hands of their gov-
ernments (DPRK HR Report, pp. 82–84).2
This verbal counter-offensive, which con-
tinues today, has little persuasive impact inter-
nationally. However, the role of such denial
and tu quoque in communicating to a domestic
audience should not be overlooked.
The continual ‘war footing’ narrative of the
North Korean state has long been recognized
as a powerful device to justify control and gen-
erate national solidarity, while positioning the
people as united in the never-ending struggle
against ‘hostile forces’ (Lankov 2013). Despite
the unparalleled grip North Korea has over its
citizens’ awareness of international criticism
of the regime, recent years have seen modes
of information penetration proliferate to an un-
precedented degree. Defector testimonies indi-
cate that belief in the truth of the state narrative
is weaker than it once was (Mortwedt Oh
2016). Evidence of rising concern on this front
was seen in the North Korean complaint in the
DPRK HR Report about the practice of South
Korean nongovernment organisations leaflet-
ing across the border, thus ‘defaming the
system and dignity of the DPRK’ (p. 111).
The government also stated that it would begin
publishing books within North Korea ‘to help
the people have a broad range of knowledge
about the nature of human rights’ (DPRK HR
Report 2014, pp. 115). These actions are repre-
sentative of the internal dimension of state ef-
forts to secure a stable image, identified
by theorists as complementary to its overall
strategy on maintaining its identity (Browning
2015). Despite organised opposition being vir-
tually non-existent and subject to the strictest
penalties in North Korea, ensuring a consistent
identity narrative both within and outside the
country is a key component of efforts to legiti-
mise its behaviour.
The North Korean verbal defensive has not
waned with the passing of time. Throughout
its public discourse, the North carries the claim
that its objection is not aimed at human rights
norms in general, but rather at the way
‘dominationist’ interests based on ‘Western
value’ (sic) (DPRK HR Report 2014, p. 89)
skew the correct development of human rights
norms in line with domestic interests. This can
be read as a weak, but nevertheless telling at-
tempt to address the narrative of international
human rights, while concurrently positioning
the North Korean state as advocating for an al-
ternative conception of human rights norms
that is nevertheless right and good and repre-
sents best interests of its people. The authors
of the Spiral Model argue that ‘naming and
shaming can only be successful if either the tar-
get actors or an audience central to the change
process actually believe in the social validity of
the norm’ (Risse & Ropp 2013, p. 14). The
analysis above indicates that North Korea does
appear to place social validity in human rights
norms, insofar as it considers the promotion
of adherence to such norms as having a posi-
tive effect on its image. The North’s response
indicates a perception that certain types of
external criticism are a threat to its ontological
security and something it will go to special
lengths to address.
4.2. Gestures on Human Rights and
Diplomatic Engagement
In addition to the statements issued in the wake
of the UN COI, the North Korean regime en-
gaged in a number of moves on human rights
worth considering for their connection to its
image management strategy. As Fahy and
Song argue, North Korea’s small, but signifi-
cant gestures regarding various protocols and
procedures on human rights places it in be-
tween the denial and the tactical concessions
stage of the Spiral Model (Fahy 2018; Song
2011, p. 175). This phase is described by its
creators as ‘particularly precarious’ and is often
used by the offending state to get the interna-
tional community ‘off their backs’ (Risse &
Ropp 2013, p. 6). In what follows, I look at
several key concessionary moves.
Perhaps the most significant action on the
part of the North Korean government was its
abrupt decision to accept belatedly nearly half
2. Fahy’s content analysis of North Korean state media in
the years following the COI found a higher frequency of as-
sociation of the COIwith theUSA than theUN or any other
state, and a collocation between the COI and ‘invasion’
(Fahy 2018).
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the recommendations from the 2009 UPR, just
2 months after the COI report’s release, and
immediately before its next review was due.
It then proceeded to engage fully in the 2014
review process, suggesting strongly that the
COI created an exceptional degree of anxiety
within the regime about its stance on human
rights. Chow’s analysis of these events de-
scribes how despite its initial refusal to accept
any of the 2009 recommendations, North
Korea praised the UPR as “The most innova-
tive and cooperative mechanism in the [Human
Rights Council]” (quoted in Chow 2017, p.
146). Then, with pressure mounting post-
COI, it engaged with the process as a means
to ‘divert attention from its human rights viola-
tions, (and) attempt to boost its international
image’ (Chow 2017, p. 157, 147). Unlike
country visits by special rapporteurs and the
COI process, the structure of the UPR makes
it more amenable to North Korean sensitivities:
it discourages ‘naming and shaming’ and al-
lows states to claim human rights compliance
simply by participating (Chow 2017, p. 148).
North Korea uses the process to challenge
prevailing beliefs about its human rights prac-
tices, to accept the recommendations least
threatening to regime control (largely develop-
ment-related), and avoid strict monitoring
regarding implementation (Chow 2017,
p. 150; Hawk 2014). In short, the UPR is a
relatively safe forum to perform gestures that
can be used to support its discourse of norma-
tive compliance.
Further tactical developments post-COI in-
cluded the November 2014 ratification of an
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), and a subsequent
submission of the fifth periodic report on the
CRC’s implementation. In 2016, it submitted
periodic reports on the implementation of the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, having
withdrawn some of its reservations to this con-
vention in November 2015. In December
2016, the North ratified the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘North
Korea in the World’) and took the historic step
of allowing the UN Special Investigator on the
rights of persons with disabilities to make an
observation visit to the country. In addition to
certain areas of procedural engagement, after
a 15-year absence at the UN, in September
2014, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su
Yong went to New York to speak before the
GA. Ri announced his country’s ‘willingness
to promote human rights dialogue and cooper-
ation on an equal footing with other countries
which are not hostile to it’ (U.N. Secretary
General Receives Letter from N.K. Leader
2014). In October 2014, North Korean diplo-
mats met for the first time with UN COI
commissioner, Marzuki Darusman, and even
envisaged inviting him to visit the country,
albeit on the condition that the EU and Japan
delete the ICC referral from the GA resolution
(Hawk 2014, p. 239). In addition, high-level
diplomat Kang Sok Ju was sent to the
European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign
Affairs in Brussels to discuss issues including
North Korean denuclearization and humanitar-
ian issues, as well as whether the human rights
dialogue between North Korea and the EU
could be resumed (Kim 2014).
Despite the value such gestures may have
added to North Korean claims to be
cooperating with, and even initiating steps
towards improvement in its human rights, the
widely dubbed diplomatic ‘charm offensive’
was largely regarded as a failure. Moreover, a
sign of what can happenwhen the North senses
control of its narrative position on human
rights is being lost occurred in September
2015 in Indonesia. A human rights event held
in Jakarta by prominent South Korean nongov-
ernment organisation, Citizens’ Alliance for
North Korean Human Rights, was invaded by
representatives of the local North Korean em-
bassy who demanded the event’s cancellation
and were infuriated that a country that had re-
cently signed an memorandum of understand-
ing with the North Korean government for
science and cultural exchanges and which had
abstained from voting for the 2014 GA resolu-
tion on North Korean human rights would then
host such an event. (N. Korean Diplomats
Cause Ruckus 2015).
The preceding description of the actions
taken by the North Korean regime following
the publication of the COI report highlights
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the many instances where it engaged in
significant image management manoeuvres,
designed to tackle the accusations on all fronts.
Although at times clumsy and inconsistent, the
words of denial, accompanying gestures and
diplomatic outreach sought to reclaim the
narrative on North Korea’s human rights
record—shown to be a fundamental compo-
nent of its image and standing in the eyes of
the international community. However, these
varying responses, while consistent with the
denial and tactical concessions aspects of a
typical human rights norms socialisation
process, are arguably constrained in their
long-term potential for a number of key
reasons, as will be shown in the final section
of this article.
5. State Identity and Prospects for Deeper
Norm Adoption?
The key remaining question to be addressed in
light of the above analysis is whether knowl-
edge about North Korean state image manage-
ment gives the international community
something to work with in continuing attempts
to socialise the state into further normative
adjustment. Two issues begin to answer this
question. First, there is the fundamental obsta-
cle of the leadership’s need to hold on to power
and defend its sovereignty, which has hindered
many forms of external engagement for
decades (Grzelczyk 2017). Writing on China,
Yang argues that the effects of engagement/
socialisation are often overrated, because trans-
nationalism can be rebuffed by the party-state
when it senses any foreign attempt to
undermine its ‘iron-clad’ hold on power.
Furthermore, international institutions are not
as transformative as often claimed by construc-
tivist analysis: the state is not always purely re-
active, and there are other sources of agency
aside from the state that can be influential on
normative change (Yang 2017, p. 88; see also
Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 7). The fundamental
threat posed to the leadership by deeper
engagement and normative transformation is
likewise problematic in North Korea. Also
problematic is North Korea’s quashing of
domestic agency via the successful prohibition
of internal opposition—an essential criterion
for a more advanced norm socialisation pro-
cess that operates both from above and below
(Risse & Sikkink 1999). Although budding re-
sistance to state discourse in North Korea has
been reported by defectors, at the same time
as cross-border economic activities have in-
creased, tangible political forces challenging
the existing North Korean state are not in evi-
dence (Cho 2011, p. 314; Song 2011, p. 190).
It is thus important not to overestimate the
socialising influence of the institutions and
actors working on North Korean human rights
issues. Moreover, now that criminal account-
ability for the leadership is part of the discus-
sion, the incentive to maintain control and
avoid the external consequences is stronger
than ever. Fahy does note, however, that North
Korea’s display of concern with image control,
alongside its ‘dramatic’ gestures to counter the
COI allegations, could have the unintended
effect of actually raising awareness of interna-
tional human rights norms domestically (Fahy
2018), and this is certainly something for the
human rights advocacy community to
consider.
A further part of answering the question on
continued normative adjustment comes
through parsing whether North Korea actually
desires to be seen as a ‘good’ state by the inter-
national community. Certainly, its commit-
ment to the political model that ensures the
regime’s survival means that it is not seeking
membership in the so-called ‘community of
liberal states’. In other words, North Korea’s
‘social vulnerability’, or the degree to which
it desires to be seen as a member of the interna-
tional community ‘in good standing’ is
constrained (Risse & Ropp 2013, p. 20). The
Spiral Model acknowledges variation in the
degree to which states experience insecurity
in their identities, or aspire to improve their
international standing. However, assumptions
about globalization creating an impetus for all
states to be seen as ‘good’ and upholding
norms that are morally sound, cannot be
applied consistently in the North Korean case.
To understand what North Korea seeks, we
must define its primary objectives regarding
self-determination and identify what type of
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international image best serves these objec-
tives, thus securing its ontological security in
a holistic manner. This is where it is necessary
to consider the other major components of
North Korea’s identity in the world—princi-
pally its status as a nuclear power. Although
there is no space here to explore comprehen-
sively the nuclear capacity component of North
Korea’s identity (see Ballbach 2015), if we are
to think about how to improve the human
rights situation, wemust consider brieflywhere
human rights and nuclear capacity interrelate,
and how the North’s position on the two is
reconciled within its identity narrative.
Post-structuralist scholars emphasise that
state identity discourses around ‘who we are’
are intimately connected with ‘what we are
not’ and what ‘we have to fear’, and that these
ideas are powerful determinants of foreign pol-
icy (Campbell 1998). Ballbach’s study of
North Korea’s Diplomatic War discourse finds
that threat—as a construction and not an essen-
tial fact—has a central place in contemporary
North Korean identity (Ballbach 2015,
p. 155). North Korea’s reliance on nuclear
weapons development is derived from a per-
ceived need to defend itself in the face of exter-
nal hostility, even though doing so necessitates
taking serious knocks to its already dubious
reputation. Nonetheless, with nuclear capacity
in place, the regime is granted special status
as a nuclear power, which is valued not just
as a form of physical strength, but as a means
to command attention. North Korea’s state
news agency has said its nuclear weapons
program demonstrates its ‘dignity and honor,
prestige and might’, as well as its position as
a ‘responsible nuclear weapons state’ (quoted
in Cha 2012, p. 232). Yet such claims do little
to assure the international community that the
North will use its arsenal responsibly. More-
over, as long as its nuclear program continues,
progress on human rights is limited in its ability
to create a positive state image. North Korea’s
policy calculations in relation to securing its
ontological security thus involve weighing the
need to be seen to be ‘good’ against the need
to be seen as ‘sovereign’ and ‘powerful’ via
the nuclear card. How much North Korea
worries about and responds to the international
community over human rights depends on
these competing factors. Ultimately, the state’s
ontological security is stable only when the
North Korean state feels its version of its iden-
tity narrative is recognized as legitimate by the
rest of the world. As a result, ‘legitimate’ rather
than ‘good’ is perhaps the best descriptor of the
goal of North Korea’s combined image man-
agement efforts. Sometimes legitimacy might
be gained from engaging in ‘good’ normative
behaviour, but only ever within the limits of
what the regime deems appropriate to its over-
all narrative at any point in time.
The options for the international community
have reached a point where there is little else
that can be sanctioned materially to pressure
for change. The emerging norm of the ‘respon-
sibility to protect’ provides the possibility of
external actors applying the ‘use of force’ to es-
tablish basic human rights standards (Risse &
Ropp 2013, p. 13). However, the nature of re-
gional dynamics makes any such action highly
unlikely. Moreover, Hafner-Burton warns of
the need to be aware of the many ways states
may respond negatively to continuing pressure
to improve observance of human rights
(Hafner-Burton 2008, p. 691). For example,
Kim Jong Un’s apparent crackdown on illegal
border crossings (Mortwedt Oh 2016) and ru-
mours of increased Chinese cooperation with
rooting out defectors and broker networks in
China in recent times might suggest that the
regime is seeking to minimize the number of
individuals escaping to report on conditions in-
side. Despite these many limitations to norma-
tive improvement, Grzelczyk argues that North
Korea is likely to reproduce decisions that
yield perceived positive results within the
limits of what it can allow, politically and ideo-
logically (Grzelczyk 2017). In a similar vein,
Goedde states that for socialisation to be suc-
cessful, ‘human rights must be framed within
North Korea’s own discourse’, focused first
on people’s social and economic welfare—
things the state have guaranteed through its
constitution (Goedde 2010, p. 571). Engaging
North Korea through UN human rights mecha-
nisms, particularly where it has already shown
some willingness to participate, plays to its
need to be seen as legitimate, and opportunities
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for dialogue and capacity building should
proceed on this basis.
6. Conclusion
This article has argued for incorporating an
identity perspective into interpreting North Ko-
rean responses to international condemnation of
its human rights record. While not denying the
significance of material factors in state action,
a case was made for creating analytical space
for the non-rational, identity-driven factors that
have been influential in North Korea’s recep-
tion of foreign and UN criticism. However, an
argument has also been made for not
overestimating the long-term progression of
such socialisation in the North Korean case.
While I have attempted to show that North Ko-
rean behaviour is not as exceptional as is often
assumed, when analysing the role of state image
management in relation to human rights, it is
necessary to consider the components of North
Korean identity holistically. It is also important
to think about howNorth Korea may usemoves
on human rights only strategically, to support a
broader narrative that also includes the need to
legitimise its nuclear capacity and continue the
decades-long war-footing against hostile forces,
as well as to de-legitimise domestic dissent. So
far, this has led to a tactical deployment of cer-
tain concessions and forms of engagement on
human rights, while arguing for defining human
rights on North Korean terms and continuing its
nuclear program to support its sovereign right to
defend itself against perceived threat. This nar-
rative—aimed at both an internal and external
audience—is pivotal to North Korea’s ontolog-
ical security and a crucial part of asserting the
legitimacy of the regime and its policies, and
concerned parties would do well to consider
the place of image-making in approaching the
human rights problem.
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